研究方法训练营第七期
活动简介:
政治与公共政策研究所“研究方法训练营”系列活动旨在面向院内师生,就公共政策学科的最新研究方法与技术,邀请专家学者开展集中培训和研讨,为我院有相应需求的老师和同学提供学术上的交流和指导。欢迎各位老师和同学参加。
主 题:Imperfect Competition and Rents in Labor and Product Markets: The Case of the Construction Industry
主讲人:罗耀 加拿大多伦多大学经济系副教授
主持人:刘生龙 清华大学公共管理学院副教授
时 间:2021年12月4日(星期六)上午 09:00-11:30
地 点:在线(ZOOM)
语 言:中文
主讲人介绍
罗耀
加拿大多伦多大学经济系副教授,宾州州立大学经济学博士。主要从事产业组织和应用计量领域的研究。研究获得 SSHRC、NET Institute 等的资助,项目涵盖非线性定价、实证拍卖和生产函数估计等,主要用于分析中国电信市场、政府招投标、拍卖、钢铁行业以及金融等。成果发表在 Journal of Political Economy、RAND Journal of Economics、Review of Economics and Statistics、International Economic Review 等学术期刊。
内容摘要:We quantify the importance of imperfect competition in the US construction industry by estimating the size of rents earned by American firms and workers. To obtain a comprehensive measure of the total rents and to understand its sources, we take into account that rents may arise due to markdown of wages in the labor market, or markup of prices in the product market, or both. Our analyses combine the universe of US business and worker tax records with newly collected records from US procurement auctions. We use this data to identify and estimate a model where construction firms compete with one another for projects in the product market and for workers in the labor market. The firms may participate both in the private market and in government projects procured through auctions. We find evidence of considerable wage- and price-setting power. This imperfect competition creates sizable rents, three-fourths of which is captured by the firms. The incentives of firms to mark down wages and reduce employment due to wage-setting power are attenuated by their price-setting power in the product market.
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